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1. INTRODUCTION 
Widespread political corruption is commonly viewed as constituting a severe threat to 
public trust in political institutions. After all, one of the principles underpinning a 
democratic political system is the presumption that governments are accountable to 
citizens (Przeworski et al., 1999). As such, the abuse of the public power entrusted to 
elected government officials undermines these procedures of accountability (Bardhan, 
1997) and corruption systematically erodes democratic principles and the faith of 
citizens in the political process. As a result, disaffected citizens are liable to withdraw 
from the electoral process (Chong et al., 2011), or they may even resort to less 
legitimate means of protest as they seek radical changes in the system (Mihsler and 
Rose, 1997; Kostadinova, 2009).  
Several papers have shown that corruption does indeed have a negative effect on 
levels of trust in government (see, e.g., Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chang and Chu, 
2006; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Kumlin and Esaiasson, 2012, among others). However, 
doubts remain as to whether these negative effects can actually be interpreted to be 
causal. Most of the empirical studies rely on measures of ‘perception of corruption’ and 
‘statements of trust’ obtained form the same survey (e.g., Chang and Chu, 2006), and so 
it is likely that both responses reflect the same underlying individual characteristics. 
Even papers using more appropriate corruption measures (e.g., Anderson and 
Tverdova, 2003; Bowler and Karp, 2004) face serious identification issues, since they 
compare units (usually countries) that not only present different levels of corruption 
but differences with regard to many other dimensions. Here, the impaired ability of 
regression analysis to adjust for differences in observed covariates is well documented 
when the between-group differences in these covariates are substantial (e.g., Cochran, 
1965; Rubin, 2001). Moreover, none of these studies addresses the possibility that 
corruption and trust might be affected at the same time by influences that are not 
observable to the researcher (see, e.g., Uslaner, 2004).  
The main contribution of our paper therefore is the use of an improved 
identification strategy, based on the use of matching methods complemented with 
falsification tests. The use of this empirical strategy is possible thanks to the availability 
of a novel data set providing information on a recent wave of local corruption scandals 
in Spain and data drawn from a new survey of trust in local government. Thus, we know 
whether a municipality has experienced at least one corruption scandal (defined as a 
“public allegation of corruption brought to light by a newspaper”) during the three 
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terms-of-office previous to our survey, while the trust survey contains information 
about the stated level of trust in local government among a sample of individuals in 
municipalities affected by a corruption scandal before the survey was carried out vs. 
municipalities in which no scandal was reported. The control group was selected using 
matching techniques and so it comprises corrupt-free municipalities that are identical 
in terms of observables to the corrupt-ridden municipalities. Interestingly, some of the 
municipalities that were corrupt-free before the survey was conducted were affected by 
corruption scandals in subsequent years. It is precisely this fact that allows us to design 
‘falsification’ tests to confirm (or discard) the causal interpretation of our results.  
This paper makes an additional contribution: it is the first, to the best of our 
knowledge, to analyse the effect of corruption scandals involving local incumbents on 
the level of trust in the local government. Earlier studies have focused on the 
determinants of trust in local government (Rahn and Rudolph, 2005), but they do not 
address the effect of corruption. Others have analysed the effect of local government 
performance and corruption on the level of trust in politicians in general, but they do 
not study the effect on trust in local politicians (Weitz-Shapiro, 2008). Some papers 
have studied the effect of corruption on local electoral turnout (Escaleras et al., 2012; 
Chong et al., 20111), but none examines its impact on local trust. Clearly, focusing on 
trust in local government is interesting in its own right, given the implications of such 
findings for any evaluation of decentralization reforms2, and also because local 
governments can be considered an essential part of any democratic system3. 
The results of our analysis suggest that, on average, corruption scandals involving 
local government do have a negative and non-negligible effect on trust in local 
politicians. This effect is even more marked in the case of individuals that have no 
ideological attachment to the party accused of corruption and/or who obtain their 
                                                 
1 Our paper is also related to that line in the literature which seeks to determine whether 
corrupt incumbents are punished at the polls (see, e.g., Peters and Welch, 1980; Dimock and 
Jacobson, 1995; and Welch and Hibbing, 1997, for the US; Chang et al., 2010, for Italy; Ferraz and 
Finan, 2005, for Brazil; Larcinese and Sircar, 2012, and Eggers, 2013, for the UK; and Costas et 
al., 2012, and Barberá et al., 2013, for Spain).  
2 Local government is the tier closest to the citizens and any evaluation will depend largely on 
how accountable it is to local residents (Bardhan, 1997). Local corruption scandals might erode 
confidence in local government and generate demands for greater centralization. 
3 The establishment of elected local governments is a crucial step in the development of new 
democracies and, in fact, often precedes the democratization of the country at higher levels (see, 
e.g. Martínez-Bravo, 2014). The effect of scandals on trust in local government is often a prelude 
to what will happen at other tiers since local scandals have ramifications for politicians at 
higher layers.  
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information from the media (as opposed to on the grapevine or from local government 
itself). Several falsification tests confirm the causal interpretation of these results. We 
show, for example, that scandals reported after the survey was conducted had no 
influence on the stated levels of trust. We also show that scandals breaking out before 
the 2007 local election had an effect on turnout in that contest, but that scandals that 
occurred after that event did not have any effect on turnout. Overall, these results 
suggest that the effects of corruption on trust can be interpreted as causal. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the previous literature 
on corruption and trust, focusing first on the different empirical approaches used. The 
third section provides some background for the analysis by describing the recent surge 
in local corruption scandals in Spain and the current discussion regarding how this 
affects trust in government and the legitimacy of the country’s political institutions. 
Section four describes the data (i.e., corruption database and trust survey) and the 
methods. Section five presents the results. The last section concludes. 
2. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
Perceptions of corruption. Most papers studying the effects of corruption on trust in 
government use individual responses to questions on ‘perception of corruption’ and 
‘statements of trust’ in government (e.g., Seligson, 2002; Chang and Chu, 2006; Morris 
and Klesner, 2010)4. The results of most of these studies suggest that countries with 
higher levels of corruption do indeed show lower levels of trust in government. It is not 
clear, however, whether this result is indicative of a mere correlation between variables 
or whether it can be interpreted as a causal effect. The main concern with this approach 
is that it is affected by the ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem, with both variables being 
measured from survey data and, more often than not, the two are even taken from the 
same survey5. It is thus conceivable that individuals respond in the same way to two 
questions that they believe to be quite similar. Some authors deal with this problem by 
employing a simultaneous equation system (e.g., Chang and Chu, 2006), but then face 
the obvious difficulty of justifying the exogeneity of the instruments.  
Contextual-level corruption. Only a few papers combine individual-level trust 
variables with contextual-level corruption measures. The most frequently cited paper is 
                                                 
4 Other similar studies include Lavallée et al. (2000), Mishler and Rose (2001), Cho and Kirwin 
(2007), Lavallée et al. (2000) and Bratton (2007). 
5 Another problem with the use of ‘perceptions of corruption’ is that they are often biased (see 
Olken, 2004; and Donchev and Uhjely, 2011). 
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Anderson and Tverdova (2003), who also find a negative and statistically significant 
effect of corruption on trust in government. Their study draws on country-level 
information on corruption perceptions from Transparency International, whose surveys 
are conducted among experts and businessmen. As such the source is not the same as 
the one used for the trust variable and so they are able to overcome the aforementioned  
‘chicken-and-egg’ problem. However, the aggregate nature of this index, which mixes 
the opinions of different agents on different kinds of corruption, means it is not that 
evident how these evaluations of corruption are linked to the citizens’ statements of 
trust. Other papers use information on corruption scandals (e.g., Chanley et al., 2000; 
Bowler and Karp, 2004; Kumlin and Esaiasson, 2012), which is the kind of information 
we draw on here. Scandals, defined as ‘accusations of corruption that have reached the 
general public’, guarantee a closer link between the acts of corruption and citizens’ 
evaluations of trust.   
The paper most similar to ours is Bowler and Karp (2004), which examines 
corruption cases related to the famous U.S. House Bank Scandal. This is the only paper 
that links specific corruption scandals with measures of trust at the level of the electoral 
district of the politicians involved in the scandal. This is also our approach, as we seek to 
analyse the effect of a corruption scandal involving a local incumbent on the statements 
of trust made by residents in the same municipality with respect to local government 
politicians in general. Bowler and Karp (2004) claim that a design of this type helps 
isolate the impact of the scandal from other potentially confounding factors. They state, 
for example, that it would be important to see “if voters in those districts whose 
legislators have engaged in scandals have a higher awareness of the scandal and a lower 
regard for politicians and legislative institutions than voters who live in districts whose 
representatives have not been caught by scandals.” Measuring both corruption and trust 
in small electoral districts is indeed an improvement on previous studies, although as 
we explain below further improvements are possible.  
Matching. A problem presented by those papers that use contextual measures of 
corruption is that the corruption-ridden units do not necessarily have the same traits as 
the corruption-free units. Most papers attempt to deal with this issue by controlling for 
other contextual level factors in a regression framework. However, the ability of 
regression analysis to adjust for differences in observed covariates is well documented 
when the between-group differences in these covariates are substantial (e.g., Cochran, 
1965; Rubin, 2001), as is probably the case in most of the aforementioned studies. In 
5
  
such a situation, using matching methods to balance the distribution of covariates in the 
two subsamples helps reduce the bias of the estimates. Hence, the objective is to 
compare cases in which all the other causal variables are as similar as possible so that 
any difference between cases can be attributed to the treatment (see, e.g., Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1984, and Ho et al., 2007). Here, we use propensity score matching to 
construct our matched sample, a technique that is the observational analog to 
randomization in ideal experiments (see, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, and Rubin and 
Thomas, 2000)6.  
A further advantage of matching is its complete transparency. The matching 
algorithm is applied before estimating the treatment so as to balance the covariates as 
far as possible in the two groups. This also ensures that the choices made at this stage 
by the researcher are not contaminated by the knowledge of the outcome variable or by 
how this choice impacts on the estimation results.  As Ho et al. (2007) note, by using 
matching, researchers are forced to specify a priori the research design they are going 
to use. In our case, this effect is further enhanced by the fact that we use matching to 
select the municipalities in which to conduct our survey. Budget considerations mean 
that once the matching has been performed and the survey has been run, it is not 
feasible to go back and change the initial design. Thus, our design provides a full 
guarantee that the matched sample was selected before we obtained any information 
about the outcome variable (i.e., trust, obtained after conducting the survey), an ideal 
trait of a well-designed observational study (Rubin, 2001) and a task suited for the use 
of propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).  
One drawback of matching is that it is only able to balance the distribution of 
observed covariates, so the reliability of the results depends on the richness of the set of 
potential control variables. Thus, matching must always be applied in conjunction with 
a test that helps discard the possibility that the results are driven by omitted variables. 
When several years of data are available for the outcome variable (both before and after 
the treatment), the matching approach can be combined with either a ‘difference-in-
differences’ method (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009) or with the ‘unconfoundedness 
approach’ (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), which involves including pre-treatment 
outcomes in the matching procedure. Then, when applying either method, there are 
                                                 
6 This method has long been employed in medicine (e.g., Rubin, 2001) and economics (e.g., 
Dehejia and Waha, 1999), and more recently in political science (e.g., Ladd and Lenz, 2008; 
Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008). 
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ways of validating the ‘conditional independence’ or ‘un-confoundedness assumption’. 
This can be achieved either by identifying differences in pre-trends in the outcome 
variable or by testing for the effect of the treatment on outcomes in a period of time 
before the treatment but after the initial period. When cross-sections of data for the 
outcome variable are not available (as is the case here), but information on future 
treatments that should not have an effect on the outcome are, a ‘falsification’ test can be 
implemented (see Heckman and Hotz, 1998; Rothstein, 2010) to rule out the possibility 
that the effects are driven by the omission of important variables.   
3. CORRUPTION SCANDALS IN SPAIN 
The recent surge of corruption scandals. In the first two decades following the restoration 
of Spain’s democratic local governments (1979-99) not much concern was expressed in 
the media, among the political elite, or the population in general about the lack of 
accountability or possible cases of corruption (see Jimenez and Caínzos, 2003). This 
situation began to change after 1995, above all as a result of events in a booming 
housing market, but it did not really make itself manifest until 1999. Before that year, 
there had been just 46 corruption scandals, but this number was to jump to 211 during 
the 1999-2003 term (see next section for a discussion of the data sources). In the 
following term of 2003-07, a further 215 scandals were reported, while in the period 
that runs from the June 2007 elections to November 2009, 131 new cases appeared. 
Since that date, the collapse of the housing market has reduced opportunities for 
corruption. Yet, the public, the media, and the judiciary have been much more sensitive 
to corruption during the crisis, which means that a substantial number of scandals 
involving earlier corrupt acts have come to light in recent years. Although we do not 
have a comprehensive record of these latest cases, we exploit the fact that some 
previously non-corrupt municipalities became corrupt after 2009 to design several 
‘falsification’ tests.  
Corruption in land use regulations. Most of the local corruption scandals that broke 
out in Spain in the recent past have involved bribes received by local politicians in 
exchange for amendments to the land use plans. Land use regulations in Spain are 
governed by a highly interventionist and rigid system (Riera et al., 1991) and most town 
planning responsibilities are in the hands of local governments. As such, municipalities 
draw up a ‘General Plan’, which provides a three-way land classification: built-up land, 
developable land, and non-developable land. The existence of a ‘development border’, a 
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line between plots of land on which developers are allowed to build and plots where 
development is prohibited, is a key feature of Spain’s land regulation system. In periods 
of high demand this border creates a rent differential, which might fuel the bribes 
developers are willing to pay to local politicians in exchange for shifting this border to 
their advantage. Although land planning is subject to participatory and transparency 
requirements, in practice local incumbents readily find ways of circumventing them. It is 
this combination of discretionary decisions and the lack of transparency that fuelled the 
recent surge of corruption scandals in land use regulations in Spain. Most of these 
scandals involve local officials that wrongfully allowed huge tracts of land to be 
developed, that allowed building to go ahead in places where it had been previously 
prohibited, or that amended the land use plan so as to permit higher construction 
densities in already developed land (Fundación Alternativas, 2007).  
Corruption, voting, and disaffection. In Spain, it is generally held that corrupt 
politicians are not punished at the polls. The press has provided intensive coverage of 
some highly prominent scandals and yet the incumbents accused of corruption have 
been re-elected. Several studies (see Fundación Alternativas, 2007, and Barberá et al., 
2012) conclude that the average punishment is quite low (i.e., around 3-4% of the vote), 
although recent studies suggest this effect may, on occasions, be greater (Costas et al., 
2012; Anduiza et al., 2012), depending on such factors as the quality of media 
information, the intervention of the judiciary, the existence of clientelistic networks, and 
the degree of ideological polarization. There has also been considerable debate about 
the possible adverse effects of corruption on disaffection (which we consider as being 
synonymous of trust in government). For example, in 2009 a prominent think-tank 
entitled its annual report The erosion of confidence and well-being. Against citizens’ 
disaffection (see Fundación Alternativas, 2010). The report warned about the possible 
long-terms effects of corruption on trust in government and on legitimacy of democracy. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Measuring local corruption 
We have had access to a database of corruption scandals compiled by the Spanish think-
tank, Fundación Alternativas (2007). In 2007, shortly after the surge in corruption 
scandals of 2006, this organization commissioned a survey of local corruption in order 
to gauge the quantitative relevance of the phenomenon. They hired a journalist in each 
Spanish province with the task of compiling all corruption scandals involving the 
8
  
municipalities in that province. The journalists looked at whether corruption-related 
news stories appeared in national, regional or local newspapers between 1 January 
2000 and 1 February 2007. Overall, a total of 426 corruption scandals were reported 
during this period.  
Since our survey was carried out in late 2009, we completed the database for the 
intervening period with internet-guided searches in MyNews, a paid digital information 
management service covering all national and many of the regional newspapers. We 
screened the period that runs from 1 February 2007 to 1 November 2009 (the day this 
search was performed). We conducted a search for news reports containing the word 
combination ‘corrupción urbanística’ (i.e. corruption related to land planning) and each 
of the more than 8,000 names of the Spanish municipalities. We found 131 additional 
scandals breaking out during this later period7. In the end, the total number of scandals 
in our database amounted to 557.  
At a later juncture in this study we also use an additional set of corruption scandals 
that were reported after the survey was carried out (i.e., between 2010 and 2013). More 
specifically, we identified 42 additional corruption scandals by performing searches in 
MyNews (in January 2014) in the set of municipalities previously selected as control 
units in our matching procedure (see section 4.2). These corruption scandals are used in 
performing several falsification tests. Below we provide more details on the rationale 
underlying these tests. 
A possible criticism of our corruption measure is that it does not take into account 
the seriousness of the case. The reason for this is that the original files that the 
Fundación Alternativas shared with us only contained the name of the municipality in 
which the scandal broke out and a brief description of the case. Only after the survey 
was carried out, did we have access to information on whether the judiciary decided to 
investigate or prosecute the politician involved in the case8. Similarly, after the survey 
was implemented, we repeated searches in MyNews for all the cases and now have 
information on the number of news stories published and on the type of newspaper 
publishing these stories (i.e., national, regional, or local). In the sensitivity analysis (see 
section 5.2) we replicate our results for subsamples of scandals considered to be more 
serious (e.g., with wide coverage, with judicial involvement, or with coverage by national 
                                                 
7 As a robustness check, we also searched for news reports containing just the word 
“corrupción”, but we did not find any additional cases. 
8 This information was also supplied by Fundación Alternativas but was included in a written 
report. The codification of these variables was very time consuming. 
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newspapers). The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained when using the 
whole sample although, as expected, the impact of scandals is somewhat higher for the 
more serious cases.  
4.2. Measuring trust in local politicians 
To obtain a measure of trust in local politicians at the municipal level, we designed a 
survey. We interviewed a sample of residents in a fraction of the municipalities in which 
a corruption scandal had been reported in the period 1999-2009 as well as in a number 
of municipalities with similar traits to those affected by corruption but which remained 
corruption free. The survey was undertaken in November 2009 and so the information 
gathered about trust in government is a reflection of the prevailing mood among 
Spanish citizens about politics at that time9. Below, we describe the Questionnaire used 
in the survey, the selection of Treated municipalities, and the construction of the 
Matched sample used as a control group. 
Questionnaire. We asked respondents the following question: ‘In the case of your 
city, do you think politicians on the local council can be trusted?’. Interviewees could 
respond by selecting one of the following four alternatives: 1 (‘Local politicians can never 
be trusted), 2 (‘Local politician can almost never be trusted), 3 (‘Local politicians can be 
trusted most of the time’), and 4 (‘Local politicians can always be trusted’)10. We used 
these four categories so individuals would have to indicate whether they had a high or 
low degree of trust, but they were then able to fine-tune their answer11. The proportions 
of individuals selecting each category were: 23.0%, 33.6%, 33.5% and 9.9%, for the 
categories 1 to 4, respectively. Respondents were also asked whether they believed 
                                                 
9This mood was becoming more critical because of the economic crisis, but had yet to hit the 
levels of discontent recorded today (i.e., according to the Spanish ‘Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas’, the percentage of people saying that ‘politicians are the country’s main problem’ 
reached 30% by the end of 2013, while it stood at 12% in November 2009, when the survey was 
carried out, and at 9% in September 2008, coinciding with the start of the financial crisis). Our 
impression is that the levels of discontent expressed at the beginning of the period are a 
response to the corruption scandals, while recent levels of dissatisfaction reflect the combined 
effect of corruption and the economic crisis. 
10 An additional category 5 (Don’t know – No answer) was included, but following standard 
procedures we do not use these responses in our analysis. 
11 There is a trade-off between having too few and too many categories. Some surveys employ a 
dichotomous question, which has been criticized for forcing respondents to categorize 
themselves thus causing information loss. Other surveys employ an 11-point scale, but the 
outcome is often the concentration of individuals in the central categories, which are often 
chosen randomly (Uslaner, 2013). The four-category scale used here falls between these two 
extremes and has been used in many trust surveys (e.g., the trust in government question used 
in the World Values Survey). 
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corruption to be a serious problem in their municipality. They were also given four 
alternative replies12. 
The survey also included questions regarding political preferences (e.g., self-
reported ideology), the degree of media exposure (e.g., whether the media is the main 
source of information regarding the activities of the local government), and information 
on a set of socio-economic controls (e.g., unemployed, type of job, marital status, etc.). 
Below, we provide full details for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
technical details of the survey are outlined in the Annex; the questionnaire used in the 
survey is available upon request. 
 Treated municipalities. Data limitations forced us to focus on municipalities with 
more than 1,000 residents13; 495 of the 557 municipalities affected by corruption 
scandals are in that size category. Because of budget constraints we had to select a 
subsample of these municipalities. We selected 160 municipalities in which corruption 
had been reported as our treatment group and 131 similar municipalities as our control 
group. The number of controls is smaller because some of these municipalities are used 
as controls for more than one treated municipality (see the justification for this below). 
In each of these municipalities, we interviewed between 20 and 50 residents, depending 
on population size (see also Box A.1 in the Annex). Our treated municipalities were 
selected on the basis of the proportions of corruption scandals that had broken out 
during each of the three terms-of-office (i.e., 1999-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2009) as well 
as across different population sizes (i.e., less than 10,000, between 10,000 and 100,000, 
between 100,000 and 500,000 and larger than 500,000).  
Matched sample. The control municipalities were selected using matching 
techniques. We constructed the matched sample using the ‘propensity score’. We 
estimated a Probit model, using as a dependent variable a dummy equal to one if a 
corruption scandal had broken out in the municipality (and zero otherwise) and as 
regressors variables deemed to have an influence both on corruption and on the level of 
trust in local politician (see below)14. The ‘propensity score’ was then computed and 
                                                 
12 This question was included at the very end of the interview so that the mention of the word 
corruption would not influence the respondents’ answers to the trust question. 
13 We lacked information on the municipal-level variables needed to implement the matching for 
municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. Spain has 8,114 municipalities, of which 3,252 
have more than 1,000 inhabitants, the ones that belong to the control group. These 
municipalities include 85% of the overall population. 
14 The Probit equation was estimated with information for all 547 corrupt municipalities with 
more than 1,000 inhabitants plus all the non-corrupt municipalities of the same size. The 
11
  
control municipalities were matched to the treatment units based on their having a 
similar ‘propensity score’15. The method used was ‘nearest neighbour matching with 
replacement’. This method allows a given control unit to match more than one treatment 
unit, which increases the average quality of matching and reduces the bias16. At the same 
time, the method has the additional benefit of allowing us to reduce the number of 
municipalities in the control group which, in turn (given budget restrictions), permitted 
us to increase the size of the sample of treated municipalities and/or the number of 
interviews conducted per municipality. 
The matching strategy builds on the ‘conditional independence assumption’, 
requiring that the treatment variable (i.e., corruption) has to be independent of the error 
term conditional on the ‘propensity score’. Thus, implementing the matching procedure 
requires that we choose a set of variables that credibly satisfy this condition (see 
Heckman et al., 1997). Only variables that simultaneously influence the participation 
decision and the outcome variable should be included. More specifically, the municipal-
level variables used to estimate the Probit equation are: % Turnout (i.e., historical 
average of turnout at local elections), % Right voters (also the historical average of right-
wing voters), log(Population), % Unemployed, Ethnic diversity, Income per capita, % 
Graduate studies, % Divorced. The information for these variables is drawn from sources 
dated as close as possible to the first year in the surge of corruption scandals in our 
database, so that they can be considered as pre-determined (see Table A.1 in the Annex 
for the definition and sources of these variables). In line with Ho et al. (2007), we opt for 
a parsimonious specification in which all the variables are statistically significant and 
help predict the outcome. The use of this specification produced a good balance of 
covariates and good matches.  
                                                                                                                                                        
random selection of corrupt municipalities (and of their matched pairs) for inclusion in the 
survey (stratified according to the term in which the corruption scandal was reported and 
population size) was performed afterwards. We checked that both the original sample and the 
randomly selected sample satisfied the balancing property. 
15 Just eight municipalities in the original sample fell outside the common support and were not 
included in the survey. The municipalities randomly selected for the survey satisfy this property. 
16 The main risk associated with this matching procedure is the generation of poor matches, i.e. 
the distance to the nearest neighbour is too large. This problem can be solved by specifying the 
caliper, i.e., the maximum propensity score distance allowed in any matching. In our case, 
however, the matching is quite good, with 95% of the matches having an absolute propensity 
score distance lower than 0.01 and all the matches having a distance lower than 0.03, which was 
the caliper finally used. We also tested other matching options (e.g., ‘without replacement’) but 
these did not work so well for the larger municipalities, so we opted not to use them. 
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The choice of variables was determined by a literature search focused on the 
determinants of corruption and trust and by data availability. First, we use the historical 
turnout at the local elections as the main proxy for structural trust. Corruption is known 
to be more prevalent in places with low levels of social capital and/or low trust in 
government (Nannicini et al., 2013). We also know that turnout is a good proxy for 
social capital and trust in government, hence places in which turnout has historically 
been high are considered to show lower corruption levels. We computed this variable as 
the average over the 1987, 1991 and 1995 local elections17.  
Second, we control for voter ideology by including the proportion of right-wing 
voters. Several surveys show that the level of support for democracy in Spain is lower 
among right-wing voters (although support remains very high), mainly because the 
national right-wing parties were filled with high-ranking officials from Franco’s regime. 
A number of studies also suggest that right-wing voters are more tolerant of corruption 
and that right-wing politicians have stronger connections with private firms (Hessami, 
2012). In fact, there is some evidence suggesting that right-wing governments in Spain 
are especially vulnerable to the influence of developers (see Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-
Marsal, 2012 and 2013). Third, we control for the size of the municipality because some 
authors have documented that trust in government rises as the size of the polity falls 
(e.g., Rahn and Rudolph, 2005), while a prediction in the opposite direction has been 
made for political participation and accountability (e.g., Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011) 
and, hence, potentially for corruption. Fourth, there is also evidence that trust is 
negatively affected by belonging to a minority, living in a racially mixed community, 
having experienced a recent traumatic experience (e.g., divorce, unemployment), and 
being economically unsuccessful in terms of income or education (see, e.g., Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2002; Gustavsson and Jordahl, 2008). Some studies also suggest that 
corruption is more prevalent in polities with low levels of education, and that corruption 
is related to income, unemployment and ethnic diversity (Glaeser and Saks, 2006). 
Using the aforementioned variables we are able to balance the covariates in the 
two subsamples. We performed several tests to determine whether or not a good 
matching was achieved. First, we performed a comparison of means between treated 
and control units in the unmatched and matched samples (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1985). These tests are shown in Table A.2 in the Annex. In the unmatched sample, the 
                                                 
17 We also computed the variable of the whole history of electoral turnout (i.e., turnout at the 
1987, 1991 and 1995 local elections introduced separately), but the explanatory capacity of the 
model was not improved. 
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treated group (the corruption-ridden municipalities) presents lower levels of historical 
turnout, a higher share of divorced people and of individuals with graduate studies, 
greater ethnic diversity and larger population sizes than presented by the control group 
(the corruption-free municipalities). In the matched sample, none of the differences in 
means between the treated and the control group are statistically significant. Second, we 
also examined the percentage reduction in the standardized bias as a result of the 
matching procedure and found it to be substantial for all the variables that showed a 
statistically significant bias before the matching: % Turnout (79% fall), Ethnic diversity 
(86% fall), log(Population), % Graduates and % Divorced (98% fall each). Third, we also 
re-estimated the propensity score on the matched sample and compared the pseudo- 
R2s before and after matching, which were 0.237 and 0.002, respectively. LR tests of 
joint significance of the regressors before and after matching presented values of 
1871.77 and 2.32, with p-values of 0.000 and 0.941.  
Finally, a number of further considerations are worth making. First, as explained, 
some variables that are plausibly correlated with corruption and with trust were finally 
excluded from the model. Although none of these variables was statistically significant, 
some of them presented the expected sign and had z-statistics close to one. These 
variables can be grouped into three categories: (i) additional measures of turnout (i.e., 
variation in turnout over the period 1987-1995, and average historical turnout 
measured at the provincial level), (ii) other plausible proxies of social capital (i.e., 
newspaper circulation or number of associations, both in per capita terms), and (iii) 
variables measuring corruption opportunities (i.e., population growth in the pre-
treatment period and specialization in the tourism industry, proxied by the percentage 
of vacation homes). We use these variables for sensitivity checks, and include them as 
additional controls in the regression18.  
Second, note that our matching procedure does not deal explicitly with the fact that 
corruption scandals in Spain are spatially clustered. We know, for instance, that the 
proportion of corrupt-ridden municipalities differs across provinces. Failure to account 
for these spatial influences could bias the estimated effect of corruption on trust as the 
response of trust to corruption may not be due to a reaction to a local scandal but the 
effect of the accumulation of scandals at the aggregate level and/or the effect of spatially 
correlated omitted influences. Despite this, we opted not to match at the provincial level 
                                                 
18 A number of other plausible confounders (e.g., past margin of victory of the local incumbent, 
number of terms in office, etc.) did not present the expected sign or offer any explanatory power 
in the Probit equation and were thus not considered.  
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so as to be able to find good matches for most of our corrupt municipalities. For 
example, matching at the provincial level would have made it impossible to find good 
matches for the largest cities and would have undermined the external validity of the 
survey (which was an explicit goal of our survey design). Instead, we decided to include 
a number of variables measured at the aggregate provincial level in the Probit equation, 
including, newspapers and associations per capita, and average historical turnout. These 
variables were negatively correlated with corruption but their explanatory capacity was 
low, so we decided not to include them in the final specification. Our interpretation of 
this is that ultimately many of the variables included are also spatially clustered (the 
case, for example, of unemployment, income and education), so they already capture the 
spatial effects. To corroborate the extent to which this is a problem we also include 
these aggregate variables together with a number of provincial fixed effects in some of 
the estimations. As we show in section five, the results do not change much after 
running these checks. 
Third, note that our sample is also balanced with regard to the individual-level 
variables obtained from the survey (see Table A.3 for a comparison of means). This was 
not intentional, as we did not perform any additional matching at the individual level (as 
suggested, e.g., in Keele, 2005). The reason why we have achieved this balance is the 
combination of the stratification of the survey by age and gender and the fact that most 
individual variables are similar to the contextual ones. In any case, the fact that the 
sample is balanced at this level means that we compare the levels of trust of similar 
individuals (in terms of the individual characteristics included in the survey) living in 
similar municipalities (in terms of the observable contextual variables used in the 
matching procedure).  
4.3. Estimation method 
We follow the recommendation made by Ho et al. (2007) and estimate a parametric 
model with the data from our final matched sample. Other authors, such as Rubin (2001) 
and Crump et al. (2009), similarly recommend this procedure, suggesting that the 
propensity score should only be used for systematic sample selection as a precursor to 
regression estimation (or to more complex parametric methods). In most studies using 
matching techniques, the analysis performed to obtain the treatment effect is a simple 
difference in means (or the equivalent to a bivariate regression between the treatment 
indicator and the outcome, in the parametric case). However, it is well known that if the 
matching is not exact, this procedure can be improved by adjusting for covariates 
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(Abadie and Imbens, 2011). There are several ways in which this adjustment can be 
performed in a non-parametric way (Abadie and Imbens, 2011; Rubin, 2001; Dehejia 
and Wahba, 1999), but for the parametric case an obvious approach is simply to run a 
multivariate regression with the matched sample and the covariates used in the 
estimation of the propensity score. Ho et al. (2007) recommend this procedure and 
suggest treating the predetermined covariates as fixed, meaning that standard errors 
and confidence intervals should be computed as in a normal regression framework19.  
In our case, the multivariate regression has two additional advantages. First, it 
allows us to use the individual-level information extracted from the survey as additional 
covariates20. The individual variables we use as additional controls are Income, 
Education, Age, Female, Divorced, Unemployed, Student, Retired, and Immigrant. 
Controlling for individual-level variables is standard in the empirical analysis of trust 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chang and Chu, 2006). In 
doing so we can purge the trust variable from a set of individual traits, which means that 
ultimately we can compare the level of trust of similar individuals living in similar 
municipalities with and without corruption, respectively (by virtue of the matching 
procedure). Second, we can also include in the equation additional controls that were 
discarded from the final specification of the Probit used in the matching procedure. 
Third, the use of a parametric framework allows us to choose the most appropriate 
estimation method. In our case, the fact that our dependent variable is categorical means 
that we should use an Ordered Logit model. An alternative would be to estimate a model 
by collapsing the four categories into two. Actually, the results of the Ordered Logit 
make it possible to test the feasibility of reducing the number of categories. In our case, 
it turns out that this option cannot in fact be accepted, so we have to use the Ordered 
Logit model. The problem with logistic models is that the quantitative interpretation of 
the coefficients is not straightforward, so we also provide information on the marginal 
probabilities.  
 
 
                                                 
19 In some types of matching, the parametric analysis might require some adjustment. For 
instance, when using ‘matching with replacement’, weights must be used to ensure that the 
parametric analysis reflects the actual observations (see Ho et al., 2005; and Dehejia and Wahba, 
1999). We take this into account in our estimation. 
20 We deal with the multilevel structure of the dataset, with individuals belonging to different 
municipalities, by clustering standard errors at the municipality level.  
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4.4. Validation of the results 
Recall that matching methods assume ‘conditional independence’ or ‘unconfoundedness’ 
(see, e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), which means that – after controlling for 
observables – the treatment variable should not be correlated with the error term. 
Therefore, the main challenge of matching is having a rich enough database to control 
for the many variables that might, at the same time, influence the treatment and the 
outcome. For this reason we examined a very broad set of possible covariates for 
inclusion in the first-stage of our matching procedure (see section 4.2). We show that a 
subset of these performed well in predicting the occurrence of corruption and we also 
undertake some robustness checks to show that the omission of the variables discarded 
at this stage does not affect the results. Nevertheless, in addition to these efforts, we also 
perform some ‘falsification’ tests to validate the matching results.  
‘Falsification’ tests are common in economics (see, e.g., Heckman and Hotz, 2004; 
Rothstein, 2010) and are based on the idea that future treatments should not have an 
effect on past outcomes. The two outcomes we examine are the level of trust (and 
perception of corruption) in 2009 and the turnout at the 2007 elections (all as stated in 
the 2009 survey). The idea of using turnout as well is based on the fact that this variable 
works better as a measure of structural trust (as argued in the previous section). Thus, 
we expect corruption scandals breaking out after we conducted the trust survey not to 
have any effect on the stated levels of trust (or of perception of corruption). We also 
expect corruption scandals breaking out after the 2007 local elections but before we 
conducted the survey not to have any effect on the turnout in that contest21. A finding 
that municipalities experiencing a scandal after we conducted the survey also display 
lower levels of trust or perception of corruption (and/or that municipalities with post-
election scandals also have lower turnout) would suggest that the cross-sectional 
matching estimates of the effects of scandals on trust are driven by unobservables. A 
finding that future scandals do not have any impact on trust or turnout would reinforce 
the confidence in the matching estimates. To design these falsification tests we need 
outcome data for units that experienced a scandal before the outcome was realized and 
                                                 
21 In this case we face the additional worry that individuals might modify their answer to the 
turnout question after learning about a corruption scandal that occurred between the 2007 
elections and the 2009 survey (that is, individuals that cast their vote might claim not to have 
voted after learning about the scandal). Note also that a finding that future corruption does not 
affect past turnout coupled with a finding that past corruption did have an effect on turnout 
(these results are presented below) would also discard this other source of bias.  
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also for units after that event. The length of the period over which corruption scandals 
occurred means that this is indeed the case here22.  
The first type of ‘falsification’ test uses trust and corruption perception data and 
relies on the fact that many more corruption scandals have broken out since our survey 
was conducted. Although we do not have a complete record of the scandals that broke 
out in the period 2010-2013, we know from the press that the phenomenon continued 
at a similar level of intensity23. This suggested that it would be worthwhile conducting 
an additional search in MyNews so as to try to find additional news reports related to 
corruption in the 131 municipalities selected as controls using our matching procedure 
(and which, therefore, had not experienced any corruption scandal before we conducted 
the survey). These searches were performed during January 2014 and we found a total 
of 42 municipalities in which a corruption scandal was reported during the period 2010-
201324. Following the identification of this group, we compared the level of trust (or the 
perception of corruption) in these municipalities with that reported in the 
municipalities that continued to be free of corruption. The problem here, however, is 
that these two groups cannot be considered comparable in terms of observables (i.e., the 
propensity score of the first group was higher than that of the second). In order to 
ensure that the treatment and control groups are comparable, we use the propensity 
score estimated earlier (see section 4.2) with the sample of 131 municipalities. We 
select matched pairs for each of the treated units using ‘nearest neighbour matching 
with replacement’ with a 0.03 caliper and dropping the observations that fall outside the 
common support (i.e., the procedure used to select our initial matched sample). We 
obtained a final sample of 75 municipalities, 38 in the treatment group and 37 in the 
control group25,26, which we used to estimate an Ordered Logit model as before. Note 
                                                 
22 Note that to design such tests we do not require data for several cross-sections of either trust 
or turnout. This is an advantage of this type of test given that our survey was conducted only 
once. 
23 For example, in an article published in El País in mid-2013, a total of around 800 corruption 
cases are mentioned (“Corruption reached 800 cases and nearly 2000 arrested during last 
decade”, El País 17 June 2013). Recall that our database contains 557 corruption scandals that 
were reported before November 2009. Although, the number of cases in the two sources is 
perhaps not directly comparable, the numbers suggest that the trend in the emergence of 
corruption scandals persisted after our survey was conducted.  
24 This number might at first sight seem very high (representing as it does 32% of the total), but 
note that the predicted probability of becoming corrupt (i.e., the value of the propensity score) 
was also very high for this group (i.e., 0.37, compared to a value of 0.21 for the municipalities 
that remained corrupt-free both before and after we conducted the survey).  
25 Note that in this case we lost only four treated municipalities as they fell outside the common 
support. Also, each control is the matched pair of one treated municipality in all cases but one.   
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that these two samples are identical in terms of observables and if unobservables are 
unimportant we should not find any differences in levels of trust between them. 
Therefore, if we find that the corrupt municipalities continue to present lower levels of 
trust (or perception of corruption), this indicates that our main results are driven by 
omitted variables that are correlated both with the treatment and the outcome. 
The second ‘falsification’ test is based on individual turnout data and is easier to 
design, because when we selected the random sample of treated units we had already 
included a number of scandals that we knew broke out after the 2007 local elections. So, 
in this case, we simply estimate the Probit for two different subsamples, with scandals 
breaking out before vs. after the 2007 local elections. Both subsamples include the 
treated municipalities and their respective matched pairs. The third ‘falsification’ test is 
based on turnout data aggregated at the municipal level. This test is usually referred to 
as an ‘unconfoundedness’ test and it has been proposed to assess the validity of this 
assumption when matching with pooled data (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). To 
perform this test, several cross-sections of the outcome variable are needed. The idea is 
to use the history of the outcome as conditioning variables in the first-state Probit 
equation. Then, at least one of the cross-sections of data that precede the treatment 
should be reserved to implement the test. The test looks at the effect of the (future) 
treatment on the outcome in a pre-treatment period, having first controlled for the 
history of the outcome. In our case, we do not have any data on the history of trust or 
individual turnout decisions. However, we do have information on the aggregate levels 
of turnout at the municipal level for the elections prior to the outbreak of the corruption 
scandal epidemic (recall that our first scandal occurred in 2000). This means that we 
can control the history of the turnout (i.e., average turnout at the 1987, 1991 and 1995 
elections) when looking at the effects of future corruption scandals (post 1999) on 
turnout at the 1999 elections. A finding that future corruption has an effect on past 
turnout (after controlling for the previous history of turnout) would suggest that our 
results are driven by some shocks that (during the period analysed) affected 
simultaneously the level of turnout (and hence possibly the level of trust) and the 
probability of a scandal breaking out. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
26 As with the original matched sample, our procedure guarantees that this sample is balanced in 
terms of both contextual and individual variables. The tables comparing the means of treated 
and controls are not included for reasons of space but are available upon request. 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1 Main results 
The results of the estimation of the Ordered Logit model, using the matched sample 
selected as explained in the previous section, are presented in Table 1. The first four 
columns report the results of the effect of corruption on the level of trust in local 
politicians, while the dependent variable in the last two columns is the perception of 
corruption. The results suggest that the occurrence of a corruption scandal has a 
negative and statistically significant effect (at the 1% level) on trust in local politicians. 
This result holds whether or not we adjust for historical turnout (a proxy of the previous 
level of trust in the municipality) for all the contextual-level variables and for the 
individual characteristics27. This provides additional validation of the capacity of our 
matching procedure to balance the observable characteristics. The table also shows that 
corruption scandals have a statistically significant effect on the perception of corruption. 
Note that a precondition for declaring a lower level of trust after a scandal is that one is 
aware of a higher level of corruption. As such, the results regarding perceptions of 
corruption enhance our confidence in the fact that the fall in the level of trust can be 
attributed to the corruption scandal. 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 
The fact that the effects of corruption scandals on trust in government are negative 
and statistically significant does not necessarily mean that these effects are 
quantitatively meaningful. One drawback of the Ordered Logit model is that the size of 
the estimated coefficient cannot be directly interpreted. The interpretation requires the 
computation of the marginal effects of a corruption scandal in each of the four categories 
of trust. In Table 2 we present these marginal effects, computed as the difference in the 
predicted value of probability of choosing one of the trust categories as the corruption 
dummy changes from zero to one, while all other variables are held constant at their 
mean value28.  
                                                 
27 Note that the explanatory capacity of the individual variables is much higher than that of the 
contextual variables (see F-test at the bottom of the table). At the contextual level, only historical 
turnout and percentage of graduate have an effect on trust. At the individual level, the rich and 
the old, as well as students and immigrants tend to express greater levels of trust in local 
politicians. The divorced tend to express lower levels of trust in local politicians. Unemployment 
and education have the expected negative and positive sign, but the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Complete results are available upon request. 
28
 The marginal effects are computed using the results from column (iv), Table 1. 
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Looking at the first row of Table 2, we see that when a corruption scandal breaks 
out, an additional 5.1% of the whole population state that ‘Local politicians can never be 
trusted’ (category 1), and an additional 1.7% state that ‘Local politicians can almost never 
be trusted’ (category 2). Conversely, after a corruption scandal the population stating 
that ‘Local politicians can be trusted most of the time’ (category 3) falls by 4.5% and the 
population stating that ‘Local politicians can always be trusted’ (category 4) falls by 2.4%. 
Overall, it seems that around 7% of the population shift from trusting to not trusting 
politicians as a result of a corruption scandal.  
In order to appreciate the size of these numbers we need to put them in 
perspective. First, we need to consider the effect of corruption on the proportion of 
individuals in each category. Note for instance that in a corrupt-free municipality, 
around 10% of the individuals are grouped in category 4 (see row four in Table 2) while 
this proportion falls to around 8% in corrupt-ridden municipalities. The number of 
individuals in this category however falls by 23.5% after a case of corruption (see row 
two in the table). The number of individuals in category 1 rises by a similar percentage 
(24.1%) as a result of corruption, whereas the percentage changes in the number of 
individuals in categories 2 and 3 are not so great (+5.1% and -12.7%, respectively). If we 
add together the two high-trust and the two low-trust categories, we find that the 
number of individuals expressing trust in the government falls by 17% and that the 
number of individuals expressing a low level of trust in the government increases by 
13%. Second, we need to compare the marginal effect with the standard deviation of the 
proportion of individuals in each category. This should give us a good idea of just how 
large the effect is vs. that of the other trust drivers. These numbers are shown in row 
three of Table 2 and the effects are striking. In the two extreme categories (1 and 4) the 
effects of corruption scandals on trust amount to around +45%, +16%, -37% and -31% 
of one standard deviation for categories 1 to 4, respectively. If again we add together the 
two high- and the two low-trust categories we find effects of +30% and -33% of one 
standard deviation for the low- and high-trust groups, respectively. These effects are 
quite sizeable, indicating that scandals seem capable of eroding much of the differences 
in trust levels across municipalities.  
Finally, another way to judge the magnitude of these effects is to compare them 
with estimates of the average effects of corruption scandals on the vote for the 
incumbent and on turnout. The literature estimates small effects of scandals on the 
incumbent’s vote, of around 2% in the US case (e.g., Peters and Welch, 1981) and of 3-
4% in the Spanish case (Costas et al., 2012). As such, the effects of corruption on trust 
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found here (i.e., that 7% of people shift from high- to low-trust categories) seem 
relatively high. Yet, this effect is lower than the one we report in section 5.2 below when 
analysing the effect of corruption scandals on turnout, which is around 1.5%. One reason 
for this greater effect might be that the disaffected react very differently: some vote 
against the corrupt incumbent, others abstain, while others vote for radical parties or 
cast a blank vote or spoil their ballot paper. 
5.2. Validation of the results  
Falsification tests. Table 3 presents the results of the ‘falsification’ tests performed. In 
columns (i) and (ii) we present the test using our trust and corruption perception data, 
respectively. The results show that future corruption scandals (i.e., those that occurred 
during the period 2010-13, and hence after the trust survey was conducted) had no 
effect on either the level of trust or the perception of corruption as stated by the 
respondents in reply to the 2009 survey. In column (iii) we present a similar test based 
on turnout and find that corruption scandals happening after the 2007 local elections 
(i.e., between the local elections and November 2009) had no effect on turnout at these 
local elections. To enhance the interpretative value of this test, in column (iv) we show 
that corruption scandals breaking out before the 2007 local elections did have a 
negative and statistically significant effect (although at the 10% level) on turnout in 
2007 (as stated in the answer to the 2009 survey). In columns (v) and (vi) we repeat the 
same test but with our turnout data now aggregated at the municipal level (using official 
electoral data). The results remain unchanged – only past corruption matters for 
turnout29. Finally, column (vii) shows the results of the ‘unconfoundedness’ test. We find 
that, after accounting for historical turnout levels, corruption scandals (breaking out 
after 1999) had no effect on turnout at the 1999 local elections.  
Insert Table 3 
The results of all these ‘falsification’ tests point in the same direction: corruption 
scandals occurring after the individual had answered the questionnaire (or voted at the 
local elections) had no effect on the stated level of trust or on the perception of 
                                                 
29 Individual turnout data might be subject to certain biases as individuals tend to over-report 
their past turnout. In our survey, for example, turnout is around 82% while real turnout at the 
2007 local elections was 74%. Also, our main control for historical turnout was built using 
aggregate data. For these reasons we present results using both individual and aggregate data. 
The results however are very similar. The size of the coefficients differs because when we use 
individual data we estimate a Probit, whereas when we use aggregate data we estimate a simple 
OLS.  
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corruption (or on the turnout decision). Only events happening before the survey was 
carried out (or before the local elections) matter. Overall, the results of these 
‘falsification’ tests improve our confidence in the ability of the matching model to 
control for the most relevant variables that jointly influence corruption and trust.  
Sensitivity checks. The main results presented in Table 1 are robust to the inclusion in 
the equation of additional controls and to the use of different definitions of corruption. 
All these sensitivity checks are presented in Table A.5 in the Annex. The first three 
columns replicate the results when adding to the equation the variables that were 
discarded in the estimation of the Probit equation but which had z-statistics close to one. 
The first column controls for additional measures of turnout (i.e., variation in turnout 
over the period 1987-1995, and average historical turnout measured at the provincial 
level), the second for other plausible proxies of social capital (i.e., newspaper circulation 
or number of associations, both in per capita terms), and the third for variables 
measuring corruption opportunities (i.e., population growth in the pre-treatment period 
and specialization in the tourism industry, proxied by the percentage of vacation 
homes). The fourth column of this table presents the results when adding regional fixed 
effects to the estimation to see whether the decision not to force the matching at the 
regional level had any influence on the results. The results do not change much in any of 
these cases. Finally, columns five to seven replicate the estimation using different 
measures of corruption that take into account the seriousness of the case. Column five 
focuses on scandals that received widest press coverage, column six on the cases in 
which the judiciary intervened, and column seven on the cases covered by national 
newspapers. The results are also qualitatively similar to those obtained when using the 
whole sample.  
5.3 Heterogeneous effects 
The results presented so far are a measure of the effect of a corruption scandal on the 
average citizen. It might be the case, however, that some citizens are more sensitive to 
corruption scandals than others. According to the literature the two main reasons 
accounting for greater sensitivity are the degree of ideological attachment to the party 
involved in the corruption scandal and the amount of information received about the 
case. Anderson and Tverdova’s (2003) seminal paper has shown that the partisans’ 
response to corruption tends not to be as marked as that of non-partisans. Anduiza et al. 
(2013) have recently replicated these results with an Internet experiment. Other papers 
have documented the effect of exposure to information about corruption on the 
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incumbent’s share of the vote (e.g., Klansja, 2011) and on turnout (e.g., Chong et al., 
2012). 
Insert Table 4 
Table 4 presents our results when we allow the effect of corruption scandals on 
trust to differ across these two dimensions: (i) ideological attachment between the 
voter and the corrupt incumbent and (ii) exposure to media information. To compute 
the first variable we rely on two sources of information. The first is a self-classification 
on an ideological scale undertaken by individual respondents (1=extreme left, 2=left, 3= 
centre, 4=right, 5=extreme right, and 6=none). The second is a classification of the 
ideology of the mayor’s party employing the same scale30. With this information we 
computed two variables: Ideology(Incumbent) is a dummy equal to one if the voter and 
the mayor at the time of the survey shared the same ideology and zero otherwise, while 
Ideology(Corrupt) is a dummy equal to one if the voter shares the same ideology of the 
party of the mayor involved in the scandal31. A priori, our expectation is that the 
variable mediating the effect of corruption on trust is the ideological attachment to the 
party accused of corruption (i.e., Ideology(Corrupt)). However, we also include an 
interaction with the party of the actual mayor because this is the approach usually 
adopted in the literature and because some papers have shown that voters tend to trust 
the government more when they voted for the party in power (see Keele, 2005). The 
other interaction is with a dummy labelled Media exposure which is equal to one if the 
individual claims to obtain information about the activities of the local government only 
or mostly from the media, as opposed to only or mostly on the grapevine (e.g., family, 
friends) or from the local government itself (e.g., though pamphlets or government 
organized meetings). 
                                                 
30 Most mayors are members of a national or regional party and, as these are few in number and 
their ideological position is well known, they are readily classified. The main difficulty we 
encounter is that some mayors are members of local parties and it is not always easy to 
determine their ideology based solely on the party’s name. In these cases we classified the party 
as belonging to the political centre. We then performed various sensitivity checks: we used just 
two major categories (left vs. right) as opposed to five, we included the centre parties in either of 
the two groups, and we either retained or discarded the individuals located at the extremes. 
Detailed information about the classifications used is available upon request. 
31 The survey also asked individuals to name the party they had voted for at the previous 2007 
local elections. We decided not to use this variable because it is clearly endogenous to the 
occurrence of a corruption scandal. It might be argued that even the ideological self-placement is 
endogenous; note, however, that this variable is perfectly balanced between the treatment and 
control samples (see Table A.4 in the Annex). 
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The results are shown in Table 4. The first column replicates the average results 
for the new sample, since some individuals did not answer the questions required to 
compute these variables. The average effect of corruption on trust is the same as before. 
Columns (ii) and (iii) include the interaction with the two ideological attachment 
variables, separately, with the variable Ideology(Incumbent) also included as a control. 
We find that only the interaction between Corruption and Ideology(Corrupt) is 
statistically significant. This result is maintained when we include both interactions 
simultaneously in column (iv). The results suggest that corruption scandals have a 
smaller effect on trust in local government of voters who are ideologically attached to 
the party involved in the scandal (current or in the past). The results also show that 
voters that are ideologically close to the actual incumbent also display higher levels of 
trust in government. Column (v) presents the results when we include the interaction 
with Media exposure: these results suggest that corruption scandals have a more 
detrimental effect on the trust levels of individuals that claim to obtain their 
information mostly from media sources. Note also that this is compatible with the fact 
that individuals obtaining information from the media tend to show higher levels of 
trust in government. Column (vi) is our preferred specification, which includes 
simultaneous interactions with Ideology(Corrupt) and with Media exposure. The results 
of the previous columns do not change. Finally, column (vii) introduces a triple 
interaction, between Corruption, Ideology(Corrupt)  and  Media exposure. The coefficient 
of this interaction is not statistically significant but the overall results do not change. 
Insert Table 5 
All in all, the results shown in this table show that corruption scandals have a 
more marked effect on a subset of individuals: namely, the less ideological and the 
better informed. In order to gauge the magnitude of the effects for different groups of 
voters, Table 5 displays the marginal effects for the four possible groups: (i) ideological 
but informed Ideology=1 & Media=1, (ii) non-ideological and informed Ideology=0 & 
Media=1, (iii) ideological and un-informed Ideology=1 & Media=0, and (iv) non-
ideological and un-informed Ideology=0 & Media=0. Several results are worth 
highlighting. First, the marginal effects are larger for the less ideological and the better 
informed individuals (group (ii)), the proportion of voters switching from high- to low-
trust categories rises now to around 11% (vs. 7%). It is notable that 8.6% of voters are 
now categorised in the lowest trust category (compared to 5.1% previously, see Table 
2). Note also that the increase (decrease) in the number of voters in the lowest (highest) 
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trust category (second row of panel (ii)) is now around 40% (having previously been 
around 24%). Likewise, the marginal effect now represents +77%, +24.5%, -64.2% and 
-45.0% of one standard deviation in categories 1 to 4, respectively (recall that these 
numbers were much lower in Table 2). Second, the effects are close to zero for the 
ideological and un-informed voters (category (iii)). Third, the effects for the other two 
categories (i.e., (i) ideological but informed, and (iv) non-ideological but un-informed) 
lie between those of categories (ii) and (iii), and the effects are slightly more marked for 
informed but ideological voters than they are for the un-informed and non-ideological. 
Although both ideological attachment and exposure to media information seem to 
mediate the effects of scandals on trust in local government, the impact of access to 
information is greater than that of ideological attachment between voters and corrupt 
politicians. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Local corruption scandals can have a highly detrimental effect on the level of trust 
shown by citizens in local politicians. On average, we find that around 7% of citizens 
shift from the high- to the low-trust categories following a corruption scandal. While this 
proportion might not seem great, it is quite large if we compare it with the actual 
number of people in the low-trust categories and/or with the standard deviation of this 
proportion across municipalities. The number also represents a larger proportion than 
the percentage share of votes lost by corrupt incumbents (see, e.g., Peters and Welch, 
1980; and specifically for local incumbents in Spain, Barberá et al., 2012, and Costas et 
al., 2012). We also find that the effect is much greater among individuals who present no 
ideological attachment to the incumbent implicated in the corruption scandal and/or 
who obtain their information from the media. In these instances, the proportion of 
citizens shifting from high- to low-trust categories in the relevant subpopulations is 
much higher at around 11%. Overall, our results suggest that corruption scandals are 
able to destroy a high proportion of differences in trust across municipalities. This 
ultimately might have real consequences for the decisions made by individuals, ranging 
from an increase in rates of abstention (we have also shown that turnout decreased after 
scandals) to a rise in the number of demonstrations and protests, or even a reduction in 
tax compliance and other indicators of civic behaviour. These aspects will be analysed in 
future work. 
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Table 1: Effects of corruption scandals on trust in local politicians. Ordered Logit results.  
       
 
 
 (a) Trust in local politicians (b) Corruption perception 
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
                   Corruption -0.266*** 
(0.069) 
-0.274*** 
(0.070) 
-0.263*** 
(0.072) 
-0.293*** 
(0.076) 
0.361*** 
(0.092) 
0.345*** 
(0.091) 
  
Historical turnout NO YES YES YES NO YES 
Contextual variables NO NO YES YES NO YES 
Individual variables NO NO NO YES NO YES 
  F-test. Contextual var.= 0 --.-- --.-- 
12.49 
[0.085] 
--.-- --.-- 
46.50 
[0.001] 
F-test. Individual var.= 0 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 154.33 
[0.000] 
--.-- 115.25 
[0.000] 
Cut test: T1= T2 2951.63 
[0.000] 
2915.37 
[0.000] 
2981.76 
[0.000] 
2759.88 
[0.000] 
419.52 
[0.000] 
429.46 
[0.000] 
Cut test: T2= T3 3527.11 
[0.000] 
3581.53 
[0.000] 
3541.21 
[0.000] 
3617.01 
[0.000] 
520.57 
[0.000] 
527.02 
[0.000] 
              Treated municipalities 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Control municipalities 131 131 131 131 131 131 
Observations 9967 9967 9967 9967 8002 8002 
              Notes: (1) Dependent variable: Trust in local politicians: 4=High trust. 3=Medium-High. 2=Medium-Low. 1=Low. (2) 
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses, or Corruption perception: 4=High corruption, 
3=Medium-High, 2=Medium-Low, 1=Low. (2) ***: p<0.01. ** p<0.05. *: p<0.1. (3) Estimation method: Maximum 
Likelihood. (4) F-test. Contextual var.=0 is an F-test for the joint significance of all contextual-level variables; F-test. 
Individual var.=0 is an F-test for the joint significance of all individual-level variables. (5) Thresholds tests: test 
indicating whether the cuts delimiting two contiguous categories are equal, meaning it is possible to reduce the 
number of categories. p-values in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Marginal effects. 
   Trust Category: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
            
Marginal effect  (a) 0.051*** 0.017*** -0.045*** -0.024*** 
      Effect in % = (a) / (b) 24.1 5.1 -12.7 -23.5 
      Effect in % = (a) / (c) 45.5 16.0 -37.5 -31.2 
Prob.(Trust = j / Corruption = 0) (b) 0.211 0.331 0.355 0.102 
St. Dev. (Prob.(Trust = j )) (c) 0.112 0.106 0.120 0.077 
          Notes: (1) See Table 1; (2) Marginal effect = difference in the predicted probability of choosing 
one of the trust categories as the corruption variable changes from zero to one. (3) Computed 
using the results of column (vi), Table 1. (4) Prob.(Trust = j / Corruption = 0) is the proportion of 
individuals selecting each of the categories in municipalities without corruption scandals. (5) St. 
Dev. (Prob.(Trust = j )) is the standard deviation of the percentage of individuals selecting each 
trust category in the whole sample. 
 
 
30
  
Table 3: Falsification tests. 
     
 Trust 
in 2009 
Corruption 
Perception 
in 2009 
Turnout in 2007 Turnout 
in 1999  
(%)  Dummy Turnout=1  % Turnout 
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
                   Corruption after 2009 0.063 
(0.166) 
-0.014 
(0.155) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
Corruption after 2007 --.-- --.-- 0.045 
(0.166) 
--.-- 0.030 
(0.021) 
--.-- --.-- 
Corruption before 2007  
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- -0.146* 
(0.075) 
--.-- -0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
                
Historical turnout YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Contextual variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual variables YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
                Treated municipalities 40 40 38 122 38 122 122 
Control municipalities 31 31 37 97 37 97 97 
Observations 2301 1853 1757 219 1757 219 219 
                  Notes: (1) See Table 1. (2). In columns (i) and (ii) the dependent variable is the four-category trust (or corruption 
perception) indicator and the estimation method used in an Ordered Logit (as in Table 1). (3) In columns (iii) and (iv) 
the dependent variable is a dummy coded one if the individual turned out to vote at the 2007 local elections, the 
information comes from the survey, and the estimation method is a Probit. (4) In columns (v) to (vii), the dependent 
variable is the % Turnout measured at the municipal level using aggregate electoral data. (5) The estimation method 
in columns (vii) is OLS. 
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Table 4: Effects of ideology and information. Ordered Logit results. 
        
 Trust in local politicians 
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
                  Corruption -0.280*** 
(0.077) 
-0.301*** 
(0.097) 
-0.342*** 
(0.080) 
-0.318*** 
(0.097) 
-0.124 
(0.083) 
-0.190** 
(0.086) 
-0.189** 
(0.087) 
Corr.  Ideology (Incumbent) --.-- 
0.057 
(0.105) 
--.-- 
-0.085 
(0.114) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
Corr.  Ideology (Corrupt) --.-- --.-- 0.214
*** 
(0.071) 
0.249*** 
(0.074) 
--.-- 
0.216*** 
(0.070) 
0.214** 
(0.107) 
Corr.  Media exposure --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.303
*** 
(0.091) 
-0.297*** 
(0.096) 
-0.298*** 
(0.108) 
Corr.  Ide.(Corrupt)  Media exp. --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.005 
(0.146) 
Ideology (Incumbent) 
--.-- 
0.639*** 
(0.086) 
0.609*** 
(0.060) 
0.640*** 
(0.086) 
0.609*** 
(0.060) 
0.607*** 
(0.059) 
0.604*** 
(0.076) 
Media exposure 
--.-- --.-- 
--.-- --.-- 
0.264*** 
(0.061) 
0.261*** 
(0.067) 
0.259*** 
(0.083) 
Ide.(Incumbent)   Media exp. --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.006 
(0.096) 
                Historical turnout YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Contextual variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
                Treated municipalities 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Control municipalities 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
Observations 8853 8853 8853 8853 8853 8853 8853 
                Notes: (1) See Table 1. (2) Ideology (Incumbent)= dummy equal to one if the individual is ideologically close to the 
actual incumbent; Ideology (Corrupt) = dummy equal to one if the individual is ideologically close to the incumbent 
involved in a corruption scandal (that might or might not coincide with the actual one); Media exposure = dummy equal 
to one if the individual obtains the information regarding the activity of the local government mostly from the media 
(instead of on the grapevine or from the local government itself). 
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Table 5: Marginal effects. Ideology and media groups. 
  
 Trust Category: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
            
(i) Ideology =1 & Media=1 
            Marginal effect  (a) 0.047** 0.013*** -0.041*** -0.020** 
      Effect in % = (a) / (b) 18.5 3.8 -12.8 -24.7 
      Effect in % = (a) / (c) 42.0 12.3 -34.2 -25.9 
            
(ii) Ideology=0 & Media =1 
            Marginal effect  (a) 0.086*** 0.026*** -0.077*** -0.035*** 
      Effect in % = (a) / (b) 42.2 7.7 -21.3 -36.8 
      Effect in % = (a) / (c) 76.7 24.5 -64.2 -45.0 
            (iii) Ideology =1 &  Media=0 
            Marginal effect  (a) -0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.002 
      Effect in % = (a) / (b) -1.6 -0.3 1.2 2.6 
      Effect in % = (a) / (c) -3.6 -0.9 3.3 2.6 
            
(iv) Ideology=0 &  Media=0 
            Marginal effect  (a) 0.030** 0.010** -0.030** -0.013** 
      Effect in % = (a) / (b) 13.4 2.9 -8.7 -14.9 
      Effect in % = (a) / (c) 26.8 9.4 -25.0 -16.9 
     
Prob.(Trust = j / Corruption = 0) (b) 0.211 0.331 0.355 0.102 
St. Dev. (Prob.(Trust = j )) (c) 0.112 0.106 0.120 0.077 
          Notes: (1) Marginal effects = difference in the predicted probability of choosing one of the trust 
categories as we change from having no corruption to each of the four mutually exclusive cases. 
(2) Computed using the results of column (vi), Table 4. (3) (b) = Prob.(Trust = j / Corruption = 0) 
& (c) St. Dev. (Prob.(Trust = j )); (b) & (c) computed using the whole sample. 
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Online Annex: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box A.1: Description of the survey 
 
The survey was conducted by “Treball de Camp”, a firm specialising in the 
design and implementation of surveys. The interviews where conducted by 
telephone between December 2009 and February 2010. Due to budget 
constraints, it was not possible to include all the municipalities in which at 
least one corruption scandal had been reported during the period 1999-2009 
and their matched pair. Thus, a representative sample of municipalities was 
selected, composed of 160 corrupt and 131 non-corrupt municipalities. The 
sample is representative with regard to three specific dimensions: i) the timing 
of the corruption scandal; ii) municipality size (in terms of population); iii) and 
geographical location of the municipalities (by province). The number of 
individuals interviewed varied according to municipality size: 20 individuals 
were interviewed in municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants; 40 if 
10.000<Population100.000; 50 if 100.000<Population500.000; and 100 if 
Population>500.000. The final sample included 9060 interviews. The sample 
was also representative in terms of individual characteristics (gender and age) 
for the whole Spanish population and by municipality size.  
To guarantee a high response rate, the survey was designed to be 
completed in five minutes. To avoid any conditioning of responses the answer, 
the survey was organized as follows: First, a set of basic filter questions 
(gender, age, nationality and municipality in which the individual is registered) 
were used to obtain a representative sample; second, the question regarding 
trust was asked; third, a bloc of questions concerning voting decisions and 
information about the individual were asked; finally, several socio-
demographic characteristics where ascertained.  
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Table A.1: 
Definition of the variables and descriptive statistics 
    Variable Definition    Mean   St.Dev. 
        Individual-level variables  
  Trust Question (1-4); 1: Never; 2: Rarely; 3: Most of the time; 4: Always 2.259 0.925 
Income Self-reported socio-economic classification (1-5): 1: Low; 
2: Medium-low; 3: Medium; 4: Medium-High; 5: High 2.754 0.799 
Education Highest level of education completed (1-5) 
1: any studies; 2: primary; 3: secondary; 4: graduate 3.232 1.275 
Age Age in years 45.46
5 
17.220 
Female Dummy variable coded 1 for females 0.499 0.500 
Divorced Dummy variable coded 1 for people who are divorced or separated 0.042 0.200 
Unemployed Dummy variable coded 1 for people who are unemployed 0.135 0.342 
Student Dummy variable coded 1 for students (do not work) 0.084 0.278 
Retired Dummy variable coded 1 for people who are retired 0.205 0.404 
Immigrant Dummy variable coded 1 for people who are not born in Spain 0.043 0.202 
Ideology (incumbent) Dummy variable coded 1 for people with an ideology closer to 
incumbent at the time the survey was carried out 0.358 0.412 
Media exposure Dummy variable coded 1 for people informed only by media sources 
(of kinds of national. regional. and local media) 0.498 0.500 
   Contextual-level variables (used in the matching procedure) 
  Corruption Dummy variable coded 1 for municipalities with at least one 
corruption scandal in the period 1999-2009 
0.584 0.493 
% Turnout Average vote turnout at the 1987, 1991 and 1995 local elections 0.707 0.091 
Income p.c. Average socio-economic condition. Arithmetic average of the socio-
economic condition according to their employment status 0.941 0.146 
% Divorced Percentage of divorced and separated among all population 0.020 0.011 
% Graduate Percentage of population with third level studies (diploma, degree 
and doctorate) among population 16 years and older 
0.082 0.048 
% Unemployed Percentage of unemployed among individuals aged 20-59 0.144 0.105 
Ethnic diversity 1- k(Popk/Population)2 where Pop_contk is population whose 
nationality is from continent k, and k refers to Europe, Africa, 
America and others 
0.039 0.048 
% Right voters verage historical vote share that the right wing parties obtained in 
1979, 1982, 1986 and 1989 local elections 0.406 0.096 
Log(Population) Log of the registered population 8.428 1.190 
   Contextual-level variables (used in the robustness checks) 
  % Provincial turnout Average vote turnout at the 1987, 1991 and 1995 local elections in 
the respective province 0.702 0.085 
%Turnout Change in the local turnout between the 1987 and 1995 elections  -0.055 0.087 
Newspapers p.c. Per day average number of newspapers sell at a province per capita  0.094 0.029 
Associations p.c. Number of associations at a province per capita 0.005 0.001 
 % Population Percentage of 2001 population that in 1991 lived in another 
municipality  
0.148 0.116 
% Second homes Percentage of houses that are second residences  0.199 0.175 
    Notes: (1) Source of the individual-level variables: own-designed survey (see Box A.1). (2) Sources of the contextual-level 
variables: (i) 2001 Census of Population (National Institute of Statistics, www.ine.es), for Income p.c., % Divorced, % 
%Graduate, % Unemployed, population by continent used to construct the Ethnic diversity index, and Population. (ii) Database 
on corruption scandals, constructed form an initial list of scandals compiled by Fundación Alternativas and own Internet 
searches (see section 3 for more details). (iii) Voting data from the Ministry of the Interior, used for the construction of the % 
Right voters and % Turnout variables. 
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Table A.2:  
Determinants of corruption. Probit estimation.  
    Coef. z-stat. 
      
% Turnout 0.653 (20.31)*** 
Income p.c. -1.451 (-3.53)*** 
% Divorced 12.502 (3.18)*** 
% Graduate 2.337 (3.03)*** 
% Unemployed 0.809 (1.73)* 
Ethnic diversity  2.620 (3.72)*** 
% Right  voters 1.728 (4.76)*** 
Log(population) 0.495 (16.12)*** 
Constant -4.980 (-9.78)*** 
              Pseudo-R2 0.237 
      
Note: (1) Dependent variable is Corruption (dummy equal to one if a 
corruption scandal broke out in the municipality between 1999 and end 
of 2009). (2) Final specification: only variables statistically significant at 
the 90% level are kept. 
 
 
 
Table A.3:  
Differences in means between Treated and Control groups.  
Contextual variables used in the matching procedure.  
     Mean t-test 
p-value   Treated Control 
          Unmatched sample 
          % Turnout 0.541 0.654 4.25 0.000 
Income p.c. 0.947 0.939 1.09 0.282 
% Divorced 0.026 0.018 14.09 0.000 
% Graduate 0.106 0.077 12.57 0.000 
% Unemployment 0.147 0.143 0.88 0.381 
Ethnic diversity 0.060 0.035 10.83 0.002 
% Right voters 0.507 0.505 0.36 0.724 
log(Population) 96.10 81.82 27.31 0.003 
          Matched sample 
          % Turnout 0.541 0.537 0.54 0.683 
Income p.c. 0.946 0.942 0.47 0.642 
% Divorced 0.026 0.026 -0.12 0.915 
% Graduate 0.105 0.105 0.19 0.853 
% Unemployment 0.147 0.150 -0.40 0.694 
Ethnic diversity 0.060 0.057 0.86 0.390 
% Right voters 0.507 0.509 -0.29 0.772 
log(Population) 96.09 95.82 0.31 0.753 
          Note: Treated group = municipalities where at least one corruption scandal broke 
out during the period 1999-2009; Control group = municipalities where no 
corruption scandal broke out during the same period. 
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Table A.4: 
Differences in means between Treated and Control groups.  
Individual variables obtained from the survey.  
     Mean t-test 
p-value   Treated Control 
          Matched sample 
          Income 2.768 2.786 -0.671 [0.489] 
Schooling 3.292 3.315 -0.373 [0.712] 
Age 45.525 44.833 1.050 [0.220] 
Female 0.502 0.491 0.495 [0.630] 
Divorced 0.618 0.609 0.514 [0.604] 
Unemployed 0.136 0.140 -0.608 [0.542] 
Student 0.081 0.086 -0.679 [0.489] 
Retired 0.204 0.198 0.392 [0.705] 
Immigrant 0.046 0.043 0.851 [0.358] 
Ideology (incumbent) 0.509 0.494 0.951 [0.304] 
Media exposure 0.374 0.367        -0.675 [0.499] 
         Note: Treated group = municipalities where at least one corruption scandal broke 
out during the period 1999-2009; Control group = municipalities where no 
corruption scandal broke out during the same period. 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5: Effects of corruption scandals on trust in local politicians. Sensitivity checks 
        
 
(a) Adding controls  (b) Corruption definitions 
 
Turnout 
Social 
capital 
Corruption 
opportunities 
Provincial 
effects 
Wide 
coverage 
Judicial 
intervention 
National 
press 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
                
Corruption -0.268
*** 
(0.077) 
-0.271*** 
(0.075) 
-0.282*** 
(0.081) 
-0.252*** 
(0.079) 
-0.296*** 
(0.095) 
-0.299*** 
(0.081) 
-0.288*** 
(0.090) 
                % Turnout  YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
% Provincial turnout YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Newspapers p.c. NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Associations p.c. NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
% Population NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
% Second houses NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
 Provincial effects  NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
                
 Notes: (1) See Table 1. (2) All the regressions include Historical turnout, Contextual variables and Individual variables. 
(3) Provincial effects: one dummy for each of the 50 Spanish provinces. (3) Wide coverage = dummy equal to one if 
number of news stories higher than the one predicted by population size, Judicial intervention = dummy equal to one 
if the judiciary has decided to investigate of prosecute the politician involved in the corruption scandal, National press 
= dummy equal to one if the scandal has been covered by a newspaper with national coverage. (4) When using the 
different corruption definitions the sample included the municipalities treated by the narrow definition of corruption 
plus their corresponding matched pairs. 
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